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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN REGULATING SPACE 
TRAVEL: CLARIFYING AMBIGUITIES IN THE 
COMMERCIAL ERA OF OUTER SPACE 
ABSTRACT 
The era of commercial space travel and the rise of abundant spacefaring 
nations has led to an increase in space activity, which has outpaced 
international space laws—laws that were originally imagined for state-
sponsored space travel in an arena with only two spacefaring states. 
International space law began with the creation of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1959 and the 1967 Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and has 
continued with conventions from the United Nations and treaties among 
nations, including the United States and the European Union, which have 
attempted to address the rise of commercial space travel. However, throughout 
this evolution in space law, significant ambiguities in terms and regulations 
have persisted. This Comment calls for a more uniform and clear description 
of the terms and regulations that govern international space law and 
leadership from the United Nations in establishing these regulations among 
the spacefaring nations of the world.  
Specifically, this Comment discusses the importance of creating uniform 
and unambiguous definitions for terms of art within the field of international 
space law such as “space object,” the delineation of Earth’s air space, and 
“outer space” itself, as well as the importance of clarifying how a state 
becomes a launching state among several parties. Part I gives a history of the 
background of international space law from its inception in 1959 to the current 
day. Part II looks at the various national and regional attempts to codify and 
interpret domestic space law and the similarities and differences between these 
regulatory schemes. Part III analyzes the United Nations’ most recent attempts 
to clarify the ambiguities in international space law and how those recent 
attempts fall short of actual clarification. Finally, Part IV presents possible 
clarifications to the terms and regulations discussed in Parts I, II, and III. 
DAVALOS GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2016 9:14 AM 
598 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
INTRODUCTION 
February 11, 2009, 04:55 GMT, approximately 790 kilometers above 
Siberia. A satellite belonging to Iridium Satellite LLC collided with a 
decommissioned Russian satellite, rendering Iridium’s satellite nonfunctional.1 
The fallout for Iridium, a corporation owned by Motorola that provides 
services to governments and news agencies in remote locations, was relatively 
minor because a single failed satellite was insufficient to significantly affect 
their overall satellite network.2 Iridium called the satellite crash a “very low 
probability event,”3 but as more private corporations plan both manned and 
unmanned flights into space, the risk of low probability events will rise 
exponentially. As Major Regina Winchester of the United States Strategic 
Command noted about the Iridium incident, “[s]pace is getting pretty crowded. 
The fact that this hasn’t happened before—maybe we were getting a little bit 
lucky.”4 
International law has entered the final frontier—space. Corporations and 
private companies are occupying areas of space exploration that were once 
exclusively the arena of states.5 While states have historically focused on 
scientific discovery, the commercial sector seeks more lucrative uses of outer 
space resources: hosting tourist trips, building space stations, and mining 
projects on passing asteroids.6 As an increasing number of commercial 
spaceships leave the Earth’s atmosphere for pursuits more out of this world, 
what regulations are in place to ensure the safety of passengers, workers, and 
the Earth below? The United Nations has left the task to each individual nation 
to impose, inspect, and maintain their own chosen set of regulations on the 
commercial spacecraft that is launched within their jurisdiction.7 Since 1961, 
 
 1 Becky Iannotta & Tariq Malik, U.S. Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision, SPACE.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 
6:00 PM), http://www.space.com/5542-satellite-destroyed-space-collision.html. 
 2 Yuri Pushkin & Melissa Gray, Russian, U.S. Satellites Collide in Space, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2009/TECH/02/12/us.russia.satellite.crash/index.html?iref=topnews (last updated Feb. 12, 2009). 
 3 Iannotta & Malik, supra note 1. 
 4 Pushkin & Gray, supra note 2. 
 5 Markus Hammonds, Asteroid Mining: Booming 21st Century Gold Rush?, DISCOVERY NEWS (Feb. 4, 
2013, 12:21 PM), http://news.discovery.com/space/asteroids-meteors-meteorites/could-asteroid-mining-drive-
21st-century-space-industry-130204.htm. 
 6 Leonard David, Alpha Station: Private Inflatable Space Outpost Envisioned, SPACE.COM (Jan. 16, 
2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.space.com/19291-inflatable-alpha-station-bigelow-aerospace.html; Press Release, 
NASA, NASA Chooses American Companies to Transport U.S. Astronauts to International Space Station 
(Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/september/nasa-chooses-american-companies-to-transport-
us-astronauts-to-international; Hammonds, supra note 5. 
 7 See generally G.A. Res. 59/115, Application of the Concept of the “Launching State” (Dec. 10, 2004). 
DAVALOS GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2016 9:14 AM 
2016] REGULATING SPACE TRAVEL 599 
the United Nations has maintained a national registry of space objects.8 As the 
number of nations with space exploration capabilities continues to grow and 
private companies have a wider selection of nations to choose as launching 
states, the international standards of space regulation must transform as well. 
This Comment explores how several experienced spacefaring nations 
govern their space programs and suggests measures that the international 
community should take to regulate commercial industries as they begin to 
expand enterprises into outer space. These regulations are necessary to ensure 
the continued safety of human beings—not just the ones who are thrust into 
space, but also the ones remaining behind on Earth. It explores the 
complications arising from regulating a shared outer space arena amongst the 
many divided nations of Earth, the concept of “launching states,” and how 
nations will decide which state’s regulations to apply. This Comment identifies 
the ambiguities that exist in both international customary space law and the 
United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly resolutions on space activity, and 
will suggest clearer definitions based on the intersection of the two. 
Part I provides a brief history of international space law, from its 
codification and inception in 1967, to the current state of ambiguity present in 
the United Nations as of 2016. Part II examines and compares the various 
regulations that spacefaring nations have created and enforced independently 
to fill in the gaps left by the vague regulations created by the United Nations. 
Part III looks at the most recent attempt by the United Nations to codify and 
regulate international space law and argues that this attempt falls short of a real 
and effective change to international space law that the advent of commercial 
space tourism and a world with many spacefaring nations requires. Part IV 
explores what possible regulations enforced or promoted on an international 
level by the United Nations could better clarify ambiguous terms among 
spacefaring nations. Part V concludes by recognizing the U.N. and the 
international community’s successes in international space law and reiterates 
where improvements can be made. 
 
 8 See Niklas Hedman, Chief of the Committee Services and Research Section of the U.N. Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, Registration of Space Objects with the United Nations, Address at UN/China/APSCO 
Workshop on Space Law, Beijing, China (Nov. 17–20, 2014), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/ 
spacelaw/activities/2014/pres08E.pdf. 
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
In 1959, the United Nations first identified the need for international 
cooperation in outer space with the establishment of the United Nations Office 
for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).9 The nations of the world first enacted a 
concrete agreement on space exploration in 1967 with the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (TPGASEUOS).10 This treaty 
did not address commercial activities in space, likely because only states had 
the capacity for space travel when the treaty was framed.11 The language of the 
TPGASEUOS recognizes space exploration as just that—exploration.12 The 
treaty discusses space exploration as “for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries,” and astronauts are described as “envoys for all mankind.”13 The 
TPGASEOUS did detail one important function of state jurisdiction over 
objects launched into space—it clarified that states retained their jurisdiction 
over objects they launch into space from the time of the launch until after 
reentry into Earth’s atmosphere.14 
After 1967, the United Nations began to make headway in imposing a few 
regulations upon the international community. The creation of a registry of 
space objects is one such regulation.15 In 1974, the United Nations adopted the 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (CROLOS) 
and began requiring each launching state to register certain information with 
the U.N. Secretary-General about objects launched into space, including the 
name of the launching state, a way to identify the space object, the date and 
territory of the launch, the object’s basic orbital parameters, and the general 
 
 9 G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, at 5 (Dec. 12, 
1959); Members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 10 See G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 19, 1967). 
 11 Frans G. von der Dunk, Beyond What? Beyond Earth Orbit?. . .!: The Applicability of the Registration 
Convention to Private Commercial Manned Sub-Orbital Spaceflight, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 269, 293 (2013) 
[hereinafter von der Dunk, Beyond What?]. 
 12 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10. 
 13 Id. arts. I, V. 
 14 Id. art. VIII. 
 15 G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Nov. 12, 
1974). 
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function of the space object.16 However, the information supplied to the U.N. 
registry was not always uniform.17 
A state may become a launching state, and thus be obligated to report this 
information to the United Nations, in one of four ways: (1) when a state 
launches a space object; (2) when a state procures for the launching of a space 
object; (3) when a state has a space object launched from its territory; or (4) 
when a state has a space object launched from its facility.18 When two or more 
states simultaneously fulfill the requirements to be the launching state for a 
single space object, the United Nations allows the two states to come to a joint 
agreement as to which state will be considered the launching state.19 
The decision as to which state is deemed the launching state has several 
implications for the state itself. The launching state assumes absolute liability 
for any damage done to property on Earth or to an aircraft within Earth’s 
airspace.20 This absolute liability does not extend to nationals of the launching 
state seeking claims, nor to foreign nationals who are involved in the launch.21 
Once in outer space, the launching state is absolutely liable for damage done to 
other states’ space objects.22 In some cases, absolute liability of the launching 
state can be applied even to states that have not ratified the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (CILFDCSO), as 
some negotiations have found the principle of absolute liability for space 
activities to be recognized as a principle of customary international law.23 
Interestingly, there is no mention of liability for damage done to celestial 
bodies in any space treaty or convention created by the United Nations.24 
 
 16 Id. art. IV; see also Hedman, supra note 8 (showing the UNOOSA template).  
 17 See Hedman, supra note 8. 
 18 G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15, art. I. 
 19 Id. art. II. 
 20 Id. art. VII. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  
 23 See G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (Sept. 1972); Paul Dempsey, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Under International and 
National Law, at 12 (2011) (unpublished comment) (on file with McGill University) [hereinafter Dempsey, 
Liability for Damage]; Settlement of Claim Between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for 
Damage Caused by “Cosmos 954” (Released on April 2, 1981), JAPAN AEROSPACE EXPLORATION AGENCY, 
http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-2-2-1_e.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).  
 24 Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier: Keeping Earth’s Asteroid Mining Ventures from 
Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 202, 216 (2014); see also G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), 
supra note 10, art. VII. 
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Beyond the registration of space objects and the jurisdiction and liability of 
the launching state, the United Nations has been either vague or completely 
silent as to what further regulations the spacefaring nations of the world should 
enforce. The United Nations only recommends that states “consider enacting 
and implementing national laws authorizing and providing for continuing 
supervision of the activities in outer space of non-governmental entities under 
their jurisdiction.”25 In fact, the United Nations does not even provide, nor is 
there an international consensus, for where Earth’s airspace ends and outer 
space begins.26 There is similar ambiguity regarding the definition of a space 
object within the international community.27 Under the current U.N. model, 
states are left almost entirely to their own devices in creating, implementing, 
and enforcing regulations for objects launched into space.28 Taking up the 
U.N.’s recommendation, several spacefaring states have enacted their own sets 
of regulations governing space launches and travel, discussed below.29 
II. NATIONAL SPACE REGULATIONS OF SPACEFARING STATES 
This Part will discuss and analyze the various national space regulations 
imposed by states in response to the U.N.’s call for spacefaring nations to 
regulate their own outer space activity, and what bodies within these states 
exist to enforce said regulations. Part II.A looks at the regulations currently in 
force in the United States and how the U.S. government enforces these rights. 
Part II.B looks at the space regulations of other spacefaring states with newer 
programs, with a special focus on the development of Chinese space 
regulations as an emerging power among spacefaring states. Part II.C looks 
more globally at the U.S.’s efforts, in conjunction with efforts by the European 
Union (EU), to develop an international consensus among space regulations 
based on the European Union’s own Code of Conduct for Outer Space. 
A. Space Law of the United States 
The United States requires that any U.S. citizen launching an object into 
outer space acquire a license or permit, regardless of whether the launch occurs 
within the territorial United States, unless the United States has an agreement 
 
 25 G.A. Res. 59/115, supra note 7. 
 26 Von der Dunk, Beyond What?, supra note 11, at 280–85. 
 27 Yan Ling, Comments on the Chinese Space Regulations, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 681, 686 (2008). 
 28 See G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15. 
 29 See Restrictions on Launches, Operations, and Reentries, 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2014); Ling, supra note 
27, at 681–89. 
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that states otherwise with the foreign government where the launch occurs.30 In 
the United States, multiple agencies oversee commercial space activities, and 
all three branches of the U.S. government are involved in the creation of 
regulations concerning such activities.31 The United States gives the Secretary 
of Transportation power to enforce compliance with these regulations, 
including the authority to “prevent the launch or reentry [of space objects] if 
the Secretary decides the launch or reentry would jeopardize public health and 
safety, safety of property, or national security or national foreign policy 
interest of the United States.”32 The Secretary of Defense and the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
each have the power to preempt the launch or reentry of a commercial space 
flight in times of “imperative national need.”33 This power, however, is 
checked considerably; the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of 
NASA are required to consult with the Secretary of Transportation, and, seven 
days after acting, submit a report to Congress justifying the preemption and 
providing a schedule allowing for the prompt reentry or relaunch of the 
commercial space object.34 
The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act also contains a provision 
governing advertisements in space.35 The Secretary of Transportation may not 
grant a license for a space launch that will be “used for the purposes of 
obtrusive space advertising.”36 However, it is left to the Secretary of 
Transportation’s discretion to deny or allow the launch of non-obtrusive 
commercial space advertisements, or to alternatively be placed on launching 
facilities.37 
The United States also requires before launch, perhaps in response to the 
CILFDCSO,38 a showing that any commercial launching entity either has 
liability insurance or has “demonstrated financial responsibility in amounts to 
compensate for the maximum probable loss from claims” by a third party or 
 
 30 51 U.S.C. § 50904. 
 31 See Henry R. Hertzfeld, Presentation at the United Nations/China/APSCO Workshop on Space Law, 
Beijing, China: National Space Law: The United States (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/ 
pdf/spacelaw/activities/2014/pres15E.pdf. 
 32 51 U.S.C. § 50904; see also Exec. Order No. 12465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984). 
 33 51 U.S.C. § 50904. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), supra note 23. 
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the U.S. government.39 The exact amount of insurance or determination as to 
whether the entity has the proper financial capacity to offset liability is decided 
through an interagency process, involving the Secretary of Transportation, the 
Administrator of NASA, the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, and the “heads of 
other appropriate executive agencies.”40 
The National Registry of the United States registers functional objects as 
well as some secondary objects deriving from launches.41 Prior to 2008, the 
United States registered objects broken off from already registered space 
objects; it no longer does so, nor does it register foreign space objects.42 The 
United States does not use the UNOOSA’s template for registration, but 
“provides comparable information as recommended in resolution 62/101.”43 
As recently as December 2015, the United States implemented a statute that 
allows for private U.S. citizens to “possess, own, transport, use, and sell” any 
“space resources” or “asteroid resources” that they recover.44 This statute 
defines both of these terms, noting that the definition of “space resource” 
encompasses “asteroid resource.” A space resource is defined in the statute as 
“an abiotic resource in situ in outer space,” and an asteroid resource is simply a 
space resource recovered from an asteroid.45 
B. Space Regulations of Other States 
The number of states with spacefaring capabilities has grown since the two-




 39 51 U.S.C. § 50904. 
 40 Id. (noting that the claimed amount should not exceed $500 million or $100 million, for third party or 
government claims, respectively); see also Hertzfeld, supra note 31 (explaining how the United States uses an 
interagency approach to governing space affairs and thus avoids delegating this power to a single agency).  
 41 Hedman, supra note 8. 
 42 Id. 
 43 G.A. Res. 62/101, Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International 
Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects (Jan. 10, 2008); see also Hedman, supra note 8. 
 44 See Space Resource Commercial Exploration and Utilization, 51 U.S.C. § 51301 (2015). 
 45 Id. 
 46 James L. Reed, The Commercial Space Launch Market and Bilateral Trade Agreement in Space 
Launch Services, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 157, 211 (1999) (noting that Ukraine, China, Japan, Brazil, and 
India emerged into the international space-launching market). 
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in and regulate space activities47 and licensing issues, both to remedy holes left 
by international regulations as well as to address nation-specific concerns 
regarding space activity.48 
1. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has legislation similar to the United States 
requiring all U.K. nationals to obtain a license for activities related to 
launching space objects, whether those objects are launched within the United 
Kingdom or outside its borders.49 The United Kingdom gives its Secretary of 
State the power to enforce these regulations and to stop any space launching 
activity in violation of U.K. or international law.50 The United Kingdom also 
requires its Secretary of State to maintain a national registry of space objects.51 
Unlike several other spacefaring powers, the United Kingdom attempts to 
define a space object within its laws. The U.K.’s definition includes “the 
component parts of a space object, its launch vehicle and the component parts 
of that.”52 This definition, similar to what the United Nations provides in the 
CROLOS, defines what is included within “space objects” but fails to define a 
space object itself.53 
2. China 
Space policy in China, one of the rising states in space exploration, is 
governed by the “White Paper.”54 This law gives officers of the Commission of 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense the right to be present 
and inspect relevant activities related to space flight, but does not specifically 
stipulate the rights these officers have as far as enforcement during 
inspections.55 The Commission also issues licenses to private entities for space 
 
 47 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Tomlinson Professor and Dir. of the Inst. of Air & Space Law at McGill 
Univ., Presentation at the United Nations/China/APSCO Workshop on Space Law, Beijing, China: National 
Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/ 
spacelaw/activities/2014/pres06E.pdf [hereinafter Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial 
Space Activities]. 
 48 See Dempsey, Liability for Damage, supra note 23, at 3. 
 49 Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, §§ 1–2, 8 (UK).  
 50 Id. §§ 1–2. 
 51 Id. § 7. 
 52 Id. 
 53 G.A, Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15. 
 54 CHINA NAT’L SPACE ADMIN., CHINA’S SPACE ACTIVITIES (WHITE PAPER) 1 (Dec. 15, 2003), 
http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html. 
 55 Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
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launches and looks at “compliance with national environmental laws and 
regulations, proof of prevention of pollution and space debris, [as well as 
requiring] a safety design report . . . and supplementary information 
concerning the reliability of their Safety Critical Systems” before issuing 
them.56 Beyond this, China’s space law is underdeveloped, with pending 
legislation57 and regulations written by the Chinese National Space 
Administration (CNSA) expected to pass by 2020.58 Regionally, China actively 
encourages cooperation among Asian spacefaring states as a founding member 
of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)59 and by hosting 
a Workshop on Space Law between the UNOOSA, the China National Space 
Administration and APSCO.60 China records only functional objects in its 
national registry, though it does register foreign objects that it had a part in 
launching.61 China uses the UNOOSA’s registration template.62 
3. Inspection and Enforcement 
Australia appoints an officer with the authority to inspect launch sites 
within the country, and these officers have more stipulated powers, including 
the ability to stop launches or destroy space objects to avoid danger to public 
health, persons, or property.63 For a private entity to obtain a launch license in 
Australia, the entity must submit both the design and engineering plans of the 
launch vehicle to be reviewed as well as present “their organizational structure 
and financial fitness, their program management plan, their technology security 
plan, and their emergency plan” before any launch can take place.64 In South 
Africa, a similar system is in place where inspectors have the power to inspect 
and be present at launch sites to ensure that these sites are complying with 
regulations; the inspectors are also obligated to report any safety risks.65 These 
 
 56 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47. 
 57 Xu Yu, Presentation at U.N. Workshop on Space Law: Regulations of Space Activities in China (Nov. 
2010), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/2010/SLW2010/02-06.pdf. 
 58 China Expects to Introduce Space Law Around 2020, CHINA NAT’L SPACE ADMIN. (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n360696/n361228/n361378/656700.html. 
 59 China’s Space Activities (White Paper), CHINA NAT’L SPACE ADMIN. (Dec. 15, 2003), 
http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html. 
 60 2014 United Nation/China/APSCO Workshop on Space Law, ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE COOPERATION 
ORG., http://www.apsco.int/NewsOne.asp?ID=357 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 61 Hedman, supra note 8. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
 64 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47.  
 65 Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
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inspectors have the power to revoke licenses for failure to comply.66 Sweden 
also designates an authority to inspect the launching of space objects and 
report findings to the government, and allows for imprisonment for up to one 
year for violations of its space laws.67 Japan and France both impose fines for 
conducting unauthorized space launch activities.68 
4. National Registries 
Japan and Russia register only functional objects in their national registries, 
and while neither country registers foreign space objects, Russia does mention 
them in its submissions to the United Nations.69 India registers functional 
objects and upper stages of launch vehicles, while France registers those two as 
well as payload adapters from launch vehicles.70 Nearly every state with 
spacefaring capabilities registers, at a minimum, functional objects and/or 
national space objects, and does so using the UNOOSA’s template or provides 
comparable information in compliance with the relevant U.N. convention.71 
5. Liability of Private Launching Entities 
In terms of liability, some nations have chosen to enact legislation similar 
to the United States, extending the liability imposed on the state in the 
CILFDCSO to the private entity launchers.72 For example, South Korea 
requires that private entities who receive launch permits obtain insurance 
against third party liability, and are required to pay compensation for damage 
caused by their launch activities.73 Other nations, however, have much weaker 
legislation or completely lack protection against accidents from launches by 
private entities resulting in damage to third parties or governments.74 The 
Japan Space Exploration Agency assumes liability for damage to third parties 
resulting from cosigned launches, but third parties are able to claim 
reimbursement only if the damage is caused by willful misconduct.75 
 
 66 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47. 
 67 Id.; Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
 68 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47. 
 69 Hedman, supra note 8. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47. 
 73 Id.; Joon Lee, Korean Space Law, UNOOSA (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/ 
spacelaw/activities/2014/pres13E.pdf. 
 74 Setsuko Aoki, National Space Laws of Japan: Today and Tomorrow, UNOOSA (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/activities/2014/pres10E.pdf. 
 75 Id. 
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6. Environmental Protections in National Space Law 
Some states have addressed environmental concerns in their space 
legislation, seeking to minimize the damage to Earth’s environment from space 
exploration.76 In Austria, private entities must agree to comply with “state of 
the art” and “internationally recognized guidelines for the mitigations of space 
debris” before being issued a license to launch within the state.77 Argentina 
also includes environmental concerns in its licensing for space launches 
requiring “that the operator provide information on environmental precautions 
taken, including mechanism for placement of the space object in a transfer 
orbit at the end of its useful life, and identify the anticipated date of its 
recovery, disintegration or loss of contact” before the issuance of any license.78 
Most states require that private entities apply for and receive an operation 
license before each new launch.79 Russia, an outlier, gives licenses for space 
launches that can last three years, provided that the entity continues to operate 
the launches as specified in the license.80 
While the extent of the authority varies by state, almost every nation has 
some entity that enforces space launches, whether that entity is an already 
existing government agent or a newly appointed officer.81 For example, 
Australia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States all give 
this appointed entity the power to stop any activity that it finds to not be in 
compliance with the nations’ own regulations, international regulations, or that 
poses some harm to public safety.82 These are all evidence of an emerging 
international consensus on how to interpret the U.N.’s recommendations that 
each state consider when enacting and implanting national laws providing for 
the supervision of activities of non-governmental organizations in outer 
space.83 
 
 76 Dempsey, National Legislations Governing Commercial Space Activities, supra note 47. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, §§ 1–6, 8, 11 (UK); Restrictions on Launches, Operations, and 
Reentries, 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2014); Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See G.A. Res. 68/74, Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 11, 2013) (recognizing the different approaches taken by states in dealing with 
various aspects of national space activities). 
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C. The European Union’s and the United States’ Attempt at International 
Space Law Consensus 
In 2012, the United States expressed its intention to develop, with other 
spacefaring nations in the international community, an International Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space (ICCOS).84 ICCOS was developed in response to the 
increased amount of space debris and the increased risk of weaponized space 
objects as the number of spacefaring nations increased.85 ICCOS was to be 
worked on with and modeled after the E.U. Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space.86 The most current draft of this E.U. Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
came out in March 2014 and does not do much to clarify the ambiguities that 
persist in both the international community and U.N. space regulations.87 
The most recent draft of the ICCOS is guilty of many of the same 
ambiguities to which the various U.N. conventions on outer space fall victim.88 
It fails to provide any definition for the term “space object,” however it does 
make a distinction between space object and space debris, providing an 
example of what a space object is not.89 It does not provide any definition for 
outer space.90 It introduces the term “space environment” without giving any 
definition as to what it means.91 
A nation that has noticeably not joined the United States and Europe in 
discussions towards the creation of the ICCOS is China.92 China, among 
others, was concerned that Asian-Pacific nations were not consulted during the 
 
 84 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements on 
International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 297 (2012); Press Release, Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm. 
 85 An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Strengthening Long-Term Sustainability, 
Stability, Safety, and Security in Space, U.S. DEP’T STATE BUREAU PUB. AFF. (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2012/180998.htm [hereinafter An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities, U.S. DEP’T STATE]. 
 86 Id.; Wessel, supra note 84, at 297. 
 87 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities art. 5.1 (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-
2014_en.pdf. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. art. 4.3. 
 90 See generally id. 
 91 Id. art. 1.1. 
 92 Michael Listner, Code of Conduct: Corrections, Updates, and Thoughts Going Forward, SPACE REV. 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2101/1 [hereinafter Listner, Code of Conduct]. 
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initial drafting of the ICCOS.93 China has pledged to cooperate in all of its 
space activities.94 Russia and China are each party to competing international 
space cooperation treaties, such as the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement 
of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer 
Space Objects (PPWT), which have many of the same objectives as the 
Western-led ICCOS.95 This struggle for power between nations over the future 
of international space regulation emphasizes the underlying problem created by 
the lack of well-defined U.N. regulations. 
III. U.N. SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMERCIAL ERA OF SPACE AND THEIR 
SHORTCOMINGS 
Recognizing the similar ways in which the spacefaring states of the world 
interpreted the treaties and conventions on space law laid out previously, the 
United Nations attempted to formalize what it perceived as the emergent 
customary international law of space in 2013 with its Recommendations on 
National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space.96 The United Nations recognized and recommended the key ways that 
spacefaring nations had regulated their space activity.97 It recommended the 
scope of national regulations over space similar to many of the regulations of 
the various spacefaring states of launch and reentry into Earth’s atmosphere.98 
Similar to the U.K. and U.S. legislation, it recommends that states exercise 
their jurisdiction over their citizens conducting space activities even outside of 
their territory.99 It recommends creating a national authority with the power to 
revoke authorization of space activities, as nearly every spacefaring nation has 
done.100 It also echoes the language of U.S. regulatory space law in that it lists 
not only the safety of persons, environment, and property, but also the national 
security and foreign policy interests of the states as relevant conditions for 
 
 93 Michael Listner, EU Takes the Next Shot in the Battle of the Codes, SPACE REV. (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2092/1. 
 94 Listner, Code of Conduct, supra note 92; China’s Space Activities (White Paper), CHINA NAT’L SPACE 
ADMIN. (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html. 
 95 Listner, Code of Conduct, supra note 92; Letter from Valery Loshinin, Permanent Representative of 
Russia to the Conference on Disarmament, and Wang Qun, Permanent Representative of China, to the 
Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author). 
 96 G.A. Res. 68/74, supra note 83. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.; see Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, §§ 1–2 (UK); Restrictions on Launches, Operations, and 
Reentries, 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2014). 
 100 G.A. Res. 68/74, supra note 83; see Ling, supra note 27, at 685. 
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enforcement by regulatory authorities.101 The U.N.’s attempt to formalize the 
regulations that the majority of spacefaring nations have already enacted is 
subject to the same shortcomings as several independent state regulations. For 
example, the United Nations again fails to give a definition to the term “space 
object,”102 and fails to even hint at where outer space begins.103 It does not 
attempt to provide any sort of framework or suggestion for how multiple 
launching states might decide which state shall register, perhaps believing that 
it settled the confusion around this question with its 2008 clarification.104 
With the entrance of commercial actors into the space arena, and as 
multinational corporations have begun launching out of various states, the 
question of which state has the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the 
launching state has become even more confusing.105 The United Nations 
recognized the possibility of two or more states qualifying as “launching 
States” in the CROLOS,106 but this Convention was drafted and signed by 
nations who believed space travel would be solely for the purpose of 
exploration and scientific research for the foreseeable future.107 At the time 
these treaties were drafted, most nations did not foresee the existence of 
commercial space activity and the bodies governing space travel, such as the 
UNOOSA, reflect this shortcoming.108 
As early as the 1990s, multinational space-launching companies had begun 
to emerge in the international community, comprised of citizens from nations 
including the United States, Ukraine, Russia, France, and Norway.109 Many of 
these multinational corporations launch their satellites overseas, partly because 
there is a shortage of launch sites in the United States to match the demand for 
satellites launched into space.110 Thus, situations are created in which multiple 
 
 101 G.A. Res. 68/74, supra note 83; see 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (noting that the Secretary may prevent the 
launch or reentry “if the Secretary decides the launch or reentry would jeopardize the public health and safety, 
safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interest of the United States”). 
 102 G.A. Res. 68/74, supra note 83. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id.; G.A. Res. 62/101, supra note 43, ¶ 3(b)–(d). 
 105 See Jonathan C. Thomas, Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 579, 590–91, 598, 628 (2006). 
 106 G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15. 
 107 See Julie C. Easter, Spring Break 2023—Sea of Tranquility: The Effect of Space Tourism on Outer 
Space Law and World Policy in the New Millennium, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 349, 366–67 (2003). 
 108 Id. at 371–72. 
 109 Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National 
Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REV. 157, 165–66 (2004). 
 110 See Thomas, supra note 105, at 590–91. 
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nations can all claim legitimacy as launching states.111 In such a situation, 
every nation involved has an equally legitimate claim under the CROLOS. 
Only an agreement negotiated among states themselves can decide which state 
shall become the launching state.112 The CROLOS does not give power to non-
governmental organizations to determine or influence which state shall be 
considered the launching state.113 Space law treaties drafted by the United 
Nations also fail to provide multinational corporations a role in determining 
which state shall be considered the launching state.114 
In 2008, the United Nations attempted to further clarify the CROLOS with 
its Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International 
Intergovernmental Organization in Registering Space Objects.115 The U.N.’s 
attempt failed to clarify the launching state dilemma in the following ways. 
First, it still failed to provide any definition for a space object.116 Second, it 
failed to provide any clarification on the order of prioritization among 
qualifying launching states, only recommending that launching states should 
“contact States or international intergovernmental organizations that could 
qualify as ‘launching States’ to jointly determine which State or entity should 
register the space object.”117 The decision as to which state is considered the 
launching state has serious implications, not only for the regulations governing 
the launch and reentry of the space object, but also for the jurisdiction over the 
object while in space.118 Further, whichever country is considered the 
launching state will retain jurisdiction over any mining operation or other 
commercial site the multinational corporation might establish on an asteroid or 
other celestial body, making the definition of the launching state even more 
crucial for the purposes of commercial space ventures.119 
 
 111 See G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15, art. II; Waldrop, supra note 108. 
 112 See G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15, art. II. 
 113 Id. (specifying that only launching states have a role in the determination). 
 114 Easter, supra note 107, at 371–73. 
 115 See G.A. Res. 62/101, supra note 43. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. ¶ 3(b); see G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15, art. II (“Where there are two or more launching 
States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the 
object . . . .”). 
 118 See G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10, art. VIII.  
 119 Charles Stotler, The ASTEROIDS Act and Hearing: Some Observations on International Obligations, 
SPACE REV. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2604/1; see also G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), 
supra note 10, art. IX. 
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IV. ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS TERMS 
This Part seeks to clarify several of the terms left undefined by the United 
Nations and the international spacefaring community. Part IV.A explores 
possible definitions for the term “space object” based on comparisons between 
different interstate treaties as well as the definitions for “space object” found in 
U.N. treaties. Part IV.B addresses perhaps the greatest ambiguity in space law: 
the lack of a single defined height limit for Earth’s airspace. It explores the 
ambiguities and attempts to suggest how, despite the manner in which the 
international community and United Nations have actively avoided this 
question, a limit could be internationally agreed upon. Part IV.C considers and 
attempts to answer the question of whether celestial bodies can or should be 
included in the definition of outer space, and if they are not to be included, 
where the air space of these celestial bodies should end. Part IV.D discusses a 
term clearly defined by the United Nations—the “launching state”—and 
considers how the freedom of selecting launching states could harm the 
commercial space-launching sector, which clearer launching state selection 
might improve. Part IV.E examines the problem of incomplete space registries 
and how solutions to the problems presented in Parts IV.C and D could cure 
these deficiencies. 
A. Defining “Space Object” 
The United Nations has not provided any definition for the term “space 
object,” and no international consensus has been affirmatively reached on what 
the term means. As mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom defined “space 
object” in its statute on space exploration as including “the component parts of 
a space object, its launch vehicle and the component parts of that.”120 The term 
“space object” is not defined within the several multilateral treaties on space 
exploration to which the United States is a party, although the term “launch 
vehicle” is defined in several of the treaties as “an object, or any part thereof, 
intended for launch, launched from Earth, or returning to Earth which carries 
Payloads, persons, or both,”121 or “an object, or any part thereof, intended for 
launch, launched from Earth into air space or outer space, or returning to Earth, 
 
 120 Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, § 13 (UK). 
 121 Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Argentine Republic on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.S.-Arg., at 13, Oct. 25, 
2011, T.I.A.S. No. 13-0730 [hereinafter Framework Agreement, U.S.-Arg.]. 
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which carries Payloads or persons, or both.”122 Several of these treaties also 
identify and define the term “transfer vehicle” as “any vehicle that operates in 
space and transfers a Payload or person or both between two different space 
objects, between two different places on the same space object, or between a 
space object and the surface of a celestial body.”123 A relevant aspect of the 
definitions of transfer vehicle found in these treaties is the absence of any 
mention of vehicles that transport goods to and from the surface of the same 
celestial object.124 Assuming launch vehicles and transfer vehicles are space 
objects, the lack of a definition in U.K. statutes, U.S. treaties, and U.N. 
conventions for vehicles that move within the same celestial body could mean 
that airborne vehicles confined to moving in the immediate vicinity of but not 
within single celestial bodies are not space objects at all, and thus are exempt 
from registering with the U.N. space body registry.125 
The term “space object” is perhaps best determined by what it is not. One 
of the few definitions that exist comes from the United Kingdom, not an 
international body, but it is circular in nature, defining a space object as 
including “the component parts of a space object.”126 The CROLOS also 
makes clear that a space object includes its launch vehicle and “component 
parts of a space object.”127 While neither the CROLOS nor the United 
Kingdom provide an explicit definition of a space object within their space 
law, they do suggest some aspects of what constitutes a space object. For 
example, defining a space object as having component parts might suggest that 
it includes some sort of manmade object.128 The inclusion of a launch vehicle 
in the definition of a space object suggests that a space object is launched into 
 
 122 Framework Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Indian 
Space Research Organisation for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, U.S.-India, art. 2(2), Feb. 1, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 09-201 [hereinafter Framework Agreement, U.S.-
India]; Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the French Republic for Cooperative Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes, U.S.-Fr., art. 9(4), Jan. 23, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 09-107 (containing a similar definition for “launch 
vehicle”). 
 123 Framework Agreement, U.S.-Arg., supra note 121, art. 2(7); Framework Agreement, U.S.-India, supra 
note 122, art. 2(6). 
 124 Framework Agreement, U.S.-Arg., supra note 121, art. 2(7); Framework Agreement, U.S.-India, supra 
note 122, art. 2(6). 
 125 See Framework Agreement, U.S.-Arg., supra note 121, art. 2(7) (including vehicles that depart to and 
from the same space object in the definition of a transfer vehicle). 
 126 Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, § 13 (UK). 
 127 G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), art. I, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Nov. 12, 1974). 
 128 See id.; Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, § 13 (UK). 
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outer space but does not originate in outer space.129 The ICCOSA makes a 
distinction between space debris and space objects.130 NASA defines space 
debris as “both natural (meteoroid) and artificial (man-made) particles.”131 The 
distinction made between space debris and space objects thus suggests that not 
all man-made objects in space are space objects as defined by international 
law.132 
Any further attempts to define space objects by their relation to space 
debris is hampered by the fact that “space debris” itself is poorly defined in 
international space regulations.133 In fact, the lack of a definition for space 
debris, and the lack of an articulation of how a space object becomes space 
debris, makes it unclear whether space debris is merely a type of space object 
or some separate space entity.134 As space debris becomes more of a problem 
for other functioning satellites and rockets in space,135 the responsibility of 
states to monitor and account for their space debris must be enforced. A 
stronger definition of space debris, ideally set forth by a binding resolution of 
the U.N. General Assembly, can help with that enforcement by including only 
man-made debris in the definition of space objects and by creating a more 
rigidly enforced registration system encouraging nations to monitor their 
defunct space debris. 
The TPGASEUOS provides another aspect of a space object: space objects 
are objects that remain under the jurisdiction of a launching state.136 Compiling 
and analyzing the information and definitions given in the General Assembly 
resolutions, national statutes and international treaties, a working definition of 
space object can be reached. The working definition could read as follows: “A 
man-made object, launched into outer space, including its launching materials, 
over which a state retains jurisdiction.” However, this definition is still 
ambiguous. For example, must a space object be launched into outer space 
from Earth? Are transfer vehicles built from space materials, which are 
 
 129 See G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), supra note 15, art. IV; Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, § 13 (UK). 
 130 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, supra note 88, art. 5.1. 
 131 Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/ 
station/news/orbital_debris.html#.VFnHmvmUcdU. 
 132 See International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, supra note 88, arts. 4.2, 5.1. 
 133 Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding 
International Agreement to Clean up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 613 (2011). 
 134 See id. 
 135 Karl Tate, Space Junk Explained: How Orbital Debris Threatens Future of Spaceflight, SPACE.COM 
(Oct. 1, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.space.com/23039-space-junk-explained-orbital-debris-infographic.html. 
 136 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10, art. VIII. 
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launched from outer space into outer space considered to be space objects? 
These are all questions that the United Nations should seek to clarify or expand 
upon in the definition of a space object as the commercial space industry 
begins to make these considerations a possibility.137 
B. Clarifying the Boundary between Earth and Outer Space 
Perhaps the greatest problem in establishing the boundary between Earth 
and outer space is the U.N.’s inability to provide a clear definition of outer 
space, coupled with the international community’s overall inability to reach a 
consensus on the subject. As of the time of this publication, no international 
body has agreed on a clear definition of where air space ends and where outer 
space begins.138 In the history of the United States, the point at which outer 
space begins has fluctuated depending on when and by whom it was defined.139 
The point at which outer space begins as defined by various U.S. officials has 
varied from fifty miles to ten thousand miles above Earth’s surface, with the 
current height left officially undefined.140 Other nations, while all claiming the 
rights over their airspace, have similarly neglected or declined to establish a 
limit on where this airspace ends.141 In the Bogota Declaration of 1976, Brazil, 
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire declared 
sovereignty of their air space as high as the geostationary orbit over their 
nations, arguing the geostationary orbit was a natural resource owned by the 
respective nations.142 Both international treaties and conventions dealing with 
airspace over nations as well as those dealing with outer space either do not 
address or do not reach any sort of consensus on the limit of their airspace 
when defining the rights and regulations existing within the two zones.143 
Leaving it to individual states to determine the limits of their own airspace and 
sovereignty has led to the absence of states seeking to give any exact height so 
 
 137 See Hammonds, supra note 5; Stotler, supra note 119. 
 138 Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 65, 66 (2007). 
 139 See id. at 84–88. 
 140 See id. at 85–88 (noting that nations such as Germany and the United Kingdom currently do not have 
definitions of the upper limit of airspace). 
 141 See id. at 81–84. 
 142 The Bogota Declaration (1976), reprinted in 6 J. SPACE L. 193, 193 (1978); see also Susan Cahill, 
Give Me My Space: Implications for Permitting National Appropriation of the Geostationary Orbit, 19 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 231, 240 (2001). 
 143 Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 66. For international treaties and conventions that do not include a 
definition, see Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173; 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180; G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10. 
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as not to limit their sovereignty any more than necessary.144 When nations 
launch objects into space, they must occasionally fly through the sovereign air 
space of foreign nations in order to reach space stations, including the 
International Space Station.145 No nation has ever raised a complaint against 
another nation for entering its air space when the object was being launched 
into space.146 Some have argued that this practice has become customary 
international law allowing free passage to objects entering space,147 but this 
only further complicates the established limits of air space and raises questions 
as to when objects become space objects. 
The lack of U.N. leadership or strongly-worded conventions is more 
apparent here than anywhere else. The United Nations must seek to establish a 
uniform limitation on the height of air space over Earth. One proposed height 
limit that the United Nations should endorse involves the lowest altitude a 
satellite can remain in orbit without being destroyed by friction with the air.148 
This limit has been criticized because advances in technology will allow 
objects to orbit Earth more closely, effectively lowering the limit of the air 
space around Earth.149 Organizations have suggested solutions to this problem, 
such as fixing the established air height to the lowest altitude a satellite could 
maintain on January 27, 1976, the date of the signing of the first outer space 
treaty.150 Establishing a fixed point for the boundary of Earth’s airspace, 
especially one based on technology from almost thirty years ago, is not the best 
regulation to impose on the world. A way for the international community to 
resolve ambiguity on one of the most contested definitions in space law is to 
fix the height to account for evolutions in technology. This approach will 
create a law flexible enough to withstand the constantly changing technologies 
and allow for the interaction between humanity and outer space. 
 
 144 See Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 66. 
 145 Lara L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for 
International Cooperation?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 507, 519 (2002). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See James, A. Beckman, Citizens Without a Forum: The Lack of an Appropriate and Consistent 
Remedy for United States Citizens Injured or Killed as the Result of Activity Above the Territorial Air Space, 
22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 249, 254 (1999). 
 149 Beckman, supra note 148, at 254. 
 150 Id. 
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C. Celestial Bodies as Distinct from Outer Space 
The next ambiguous term in international space law is “outer space.” As 
mentioned above, no nation or international treaty has reached a consensus on 
where the Earth’s airspace ends and outer space begins.151 After establishing 
the end of the Earth’s airspace and the beginning of outer space, there is still 
ambiguity as to what exactly constitutes outer space beyond Earth’s 
boundaries. The language of international treaties and national space 
regulations always append the phrase “and the moon and other celestial 
bodies.” This phrasing suggests that the definition of outer space includes 
anywhere beyond Earth’s boundaries, wherever that might be, or conversely 
suggests that the term outer space on its own does not include “the moon and 
other celestial bodies.152 The consistent addition of “the moon and other 
celestial bodies” might only serve as clarification for any state attempting to 
claim any part of the moon or various celestial bodies that exist outside the 
Earth, clarifying that the provisions of the TPGASEUOS disallows such 
actions in these areas. The distinction might also be borne out of an awareness 
of the future possibility that outer space will no longer be part of a binary Earth 
and non-Earth definition of outer space, but will be distinguished from certain 
celestial bodies with heavy commercial or human presence.153 As the 
commercial sector expands onto celestial bodies, the United Nations, as well as 
spacefaring states, should seek to revisit the very definition and concept of 
outer space.154 
The concept of a definition of outer space that does not include certain 
celestial bodies raises a still unanswered question regarding the planets and 
asteroids above—the problem of determining where the airspace of a 
commercial site on an asteroid or other celestial body ends and where outer 
space begins again. Here, it could be useful to use Article IX of the 
TPGASEUOS, which requires that states take measures to avoid harmful 
interference with another state’s exploration and use of outer space.155 In 
general, the height limit of airspace on Earth extends somewhat beyond what 
most would consider harmful interference.156 On a commercial site, such as a 
mining operation, both the lack of an atmosphere on certain celestial bodies 
 
 151 Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 66. 
 152 See, e.g., Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38, § 7 (UK); G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10. 
 153 Feinman, supra note 24, at 205–06. 
 154 See id. 
 155 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), supra note 10, art. IX; see Stotler, supra note 119. 
 156 See Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 87. 
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(like asteroids), as well as the lower height were harmful interference would 
occur, suggest a much lower and perhaps more easily defined demarcation of 
where outer space begins and ends past the celestial body.157 
The ambiguity in defining where outer space begins and ends in relation to 
celestial bodies is compounded by the ambiguity surrounding how outer space 
is defined.158 Although it does not define outer space, the TPGASEUOS makes 
clear that it applies to “Outer Space, including the moon and celestial 
bodies.”159 In fact, the term outer space in the TPGASEUOS is almost always 
followed by the phrase “including the moon and Celestial bodies.”160 The fact 
that the TPGASEUOS made explicitly clear multiple times that it was 
including “the moon and celestial bodies” in the specific article regulation 
suggests that the definition of outer space alone does not include the moon and 
celestial bodies unless specifically mentioned. Employing this logic, the 
definition of outer space might also exclude the space resources introduced by 
U.S. legislation in 2015, placing any resources that might be mined by a 
private entity outside the boundary of outer space.161 
D. Resolving the Uncertainty in Launching State Selection 
The ambiguity present in the selection of a “launching state” is another area 
where more precise definitions and leadership by the United Nations are 
needed. Unlike the other ambiguous terms, the definition and requirements of a 
launching state are clearly laid out by the United Nations in several of its 
treaties and conventions governing international space law.162 The ambiguity 
arises when multiple states qualify as the launching state.163 The decision of 
which state shall be the launching state is left entirely to agreements between 
the nations, without any other guidelines or factors to be considered.164 The 
problems presented by this ambiguity are especially present in the different 
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ways that states register objects in their national registries and in the 
information they provide to the United Nations for its registry of space objects. 
This ambiguity could be solved in several ways. The United Nations may 
revisit the concept of a launching state entirely by recognizing the significant 
impact that the rise of private commercial launching agents have had on the 
launching state paradigm, especially as it applies to the CILFDCSO.165 
Alternatively, the United Nations could develop a hierarchy of launching states 
where certain launching state qualifications have precedence over others. The 
spacefaring states of the world could make clear in their treaties and 
agreements with each other exactly how a launching state will be designated, 
as some agreements currently do.166 
E. The Uncertain Registration of Space Objects 
Closely related to the problem of ambiguity over the launching state is the 
ambiguity present in the U.N.’s rules regarding registration of space objects, 
both with the U.N.’s registries and with the national registries.167 As mentioned 
earlier, states differ significantly in what objects and information they provide 
in their national registries to the United Nations.168 A clarification of two 
previously discussed ambiguous terms, space objects and the launching state, 
would serve to rectify the current confusion and discord present among 
different states’ national registries.169 A clearer definition of space objects, 
specifically a definition including non-functional objects in space, and a more 
precise selection process for launching states, will allow for the national 
registries reported to the United Nations to more effectively combat and avoid 
the dangers that space debris presents to space craft orbiting the earth in outer 
space—dangers that may cause a repeat of the 2009 satellite collision.170 
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CONCLUSION 
The United Nations and the international community have succeeded in 
clarifying international space regulations, and they should continue to uphold 
and encourage other spacefaring nations to follow customary international law. 
The existence of regulatory authorities among the spacefaring nations should 
continue to be fostered by the international community and the United 
Nations.171 The countries that do not specify the powers of their space 
regulation authorities should be encouraged to enact legislation to provide their 
authorities with broader enforcement powers.172 
The international community and the U.N.’s previous attempts to establish 
as international customary law the jurisdiction over its citizens, even in areas 
outside the territory of the nation, should be continued because they serve as a 
model for space regulation.173 Further, the states that currently exercise these 
types of space jurisdictions should promote it among the other spacefaring 
nations. This type of jurisdiction ensures the enforcement of regulations in 
areas where jurisdiction arising from the CROLOS might fall short.174 
The exploration of outer space has changed significantly since the United 
Nations passed the TPGASEUOS two years before man would first set foot on 
the moon.175 The evolution of space technologies as well as the emergence and 
growth of commercial ventures into outer space have revealed ambiguities and 
created shortcomings in the international regulations of outer space that must 
be addressed to safely continue the expansion of mankind beyond the confines 
of Earth. The foundation set by the U.N. space treaties and the similarities 
found in the regulations of the individual spacefaring nations, should serve as a 
model upon which to base new regulations. But where these regulations 
confine the evolution of space law through outdated modes of thinking about 
space exploration or ambiguous definitions of terms of art, the international 
community, led by the United Nations, must seek to clarify international space 
regulations to foster the movement of man to the stars. 
The United Nations has shown an ability to foster this evolution with its 
more recent treaties, in which it codified and clarified the growing body of 
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customary international law among the spacefaring states.176 The international 
community is also beginning to recognize and create solutions to the need for 
more uniform international space regulations.177 Continued U.N. action that 
not only recognizes the direction of evolving international space regulations, 
but also serves as a leader in shaping this area of international law is critical. 
Clarifying the ambiguity as to where outer space lies, what a space object is, 
and how a launching state should be chosen are all questions the international 
community must answer as space exploration and commercial ventures beyond 
the Earth continue to expand. The international spacefaring community has 
grown since the first satellite escaped Earth’s orbit and entered outer space.178 
Outer space has become more crowded, and it appears that it will only 
continue to do so in the future.179 The international community has been very 
fortunate, even lucky, that the number of international space incidents have 
remained as low as they have,180 but the time for the international community 
to rely on luck has ended. The time for true international consensus and 
cooperation, led by definitive words from the United Nations, has come. 
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